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Network services can be provided efficiently in competitive markets, if non-
discriminatory access to the complementary infrastructure capacities is guaran-
teed. The sector-symmetric application of the disaggregated regulatory approach 
to railways and telecommunications reveals the different role of mandatory ac-
cess. Whereas in telecommunications only the local loop may create a remaining 
regulatory problem, mandatory access has to be guaranteed with respect to the 
railway infrastructure as a whole. In spite of the large phasing-out potentials of 
sector-specific regulation in telecommunications, this sector is still under the 
burden of overregulation. In contrast, in the railway sector mandatory access has 
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Since the privatization and liberalization of network industries, sector-specific
regulation of network access is gaining increasing relevance. Networks are typi-
cally characterized by different (sub)-parts which strongly complement each
other. A large spectrum of different historically grown organizational and insti-
tutional structures can be observed, which solve the relevant coordination prob-
lems in institutionally different ways. For example, an increasing trend towards
vertical disintegration of railroad systems (mainly in European countries) can be
observed. The traditional vertically integrated railroad systems are gradually
opening to allow access for alternative service suppliers on European railroad
networks. Moreover, a strong tendency towards vertical disintegration within
telecommunications networks can be observed, including service competition
and competing network carriers.
The reform of European network industries strongly promotes the competitive
supply of network services. Free entry of service companies is expected to im-
prove the quality and variety of network services as well as provide incentives
for a more cost-efficient production of network services. Vertical integration
with one monolithic enterprise is no longer considered as the adequate organ-
izational form of network industries. Instead, the current EU policy is to separate
the supply of network services from the provision of infrastructure at least with
respect to book-keeping. Whereas the markets for network services and the mar-
ket for infrastructure capacities are complementary, they are considered as dif-
ferent. The provider of network services may or may not be the owner of the
infrastructure. If the provider of network services is not the owner of the infra-
structure, he obviously needs non-discriminatory access to the complementary
infrastructure capacities.
The design of network access is still an important area of future institutional re-
form in network industries. The telecommunications industry became the pre-
cursor for detailed mandatory access regulation; in the meantime, statutory de-
signs for sector-specific regulation have also been developed for the electricity
and gas sector, and for the railway sector. In Germany, the competences of the2
new regulatory authorities are bundled within the newly established Federal
Network Agency, the former Agency for Telecommunication and Postal Regu-
lation. In this context, the design and implementation of a consistent, analyti-
cally founded regulatory approach becomes topical, in order to guarantee a
proper application of regulatory instruments.
The chosen case studies (telecommunications and railroad systems) not only
point out the importance of variety and search for competitive network services
but also the proper division of labour between unregulated and mandatory ac-
cess to network infrastructures. It is shown that the problem of non-
discriminatory access has to be solved with respect to the railway infrastructure
as a whole, whereas in telecommunications only the local loop may create a re-
maining regulatory problem.
2. Negotiated versus mandatory network access
It is an important difference whether network access is a result of private nego-
tiations or mandatory with a corresponding set of regulations. Private bargain-
ing, the reference point in a competitive economy, is also valid for network in-
dustries. Only if the bargaining process for access conditions is disturbed by
market power may regulatory interventions be justified. Nevertheless, public
policies in network industries, in particular mandatory access, should avoid the
danger of creating incentives to form inefficient networks (Spulber, Yoo, 2005,
pp. 677 f.). The proper role of mandatory access strongly varies in different net-
work industries, depending on the occurrence of network-specific market power.
2.1 The reference point of private bargaining
Active and potential competition fulfils the function of mitigating market power
guaranteeing non-discriminatory access. It can be expected that private bar-
gaining of access conditions between the competitive network providers will
lead to economically efficient solutions. Strategic behaviour which systemati-3
cally disturbs the competition process can be excluded, because every bargain-
ing partner can easily be substituted by an alternative (potential) network carrier.
Private bargaining solutions for access conditions among competitive network
carriers are not only beneficial for the carriers themselves, but in particular im-
prove the market performance of the network services provided to the custom-
ers. Independent of the market size of the carriers involved, inefficient suppliers
of network services are rapidly confronted with strongly decreasing market
shares due to the strong pressure of alternative (potential) network service pro-
viders. Government regulation of such private bargaining processes would arti-
ficially disturb the bargaining process and automatically lead to inferior solu-
tions. In particular, the market driven endogenous search for service networks
with different quality characteristics, including transborder oriented service net-
works, would be disturbed.
2.2 The impact of network-specific market power on bargaining
It is necessary to differentiate between those areas in which active and potential
competition can work and other areas, where a natural monopoly situation in
combination with irreversible costs (monopolistic bottlenecks) exists (e.g.
Knieps, 1997, pp. 327 f.). Sunk costs are no longer decision relevant for the in-
cumbent monopoly, whereas the potential entrant is confronted with the decision
whether to build network infrastructure and thus spend the irreversible costs.
The incumbent firms therefore have lower decision relevant costs than the po-
tential entrants. This creates scope for strategic behaviour of the incumbent
firms, so that inefficient production and monopoly profits will not necessarily
result in market entry. Mandatory access is only justified in monopolistic bottle-
neck areas. In all other cases, the existence of active and potential competition
will lead to efficient bargaining.
In contrast to competitive networks, market power involved in network infra-
structures fundamentally disturbs private bargaining on network access. One
extreme alternative could be (vertical) foreclosure of competitors on a comple-4
mentary service market. Such a tying can be used as a method of price discrimi-
nation, enabling a monopolist to earn higher profits (e.g. Posner, 1976, pp. 171-
184). Another way of abusing market power within the bargaining process on
access conditions is to provide insufficient network access quality or demand
excessive access charges.
3. Mandatory access in the German telecommunications sector
3.1 The period of over-regulation
Similar to other European countries, German telecommunications policy has
been strongly influenced by asymmetric market power regulation with an intrin-
sic bias against incumbent carriers. As a consequence, excessive regulation due
to an oversized regulatory basis occurred. The specification of the regulatory
basis is not explicitly founded on the identification of network-specific market
power. Instead, classification as a dominant firm as laid down in competition
law is chosen as the central precondition to justify sector-specific regulation. For
example, the provision of long-distance telecommunications infrastructure and
voice telephony services by a carrier classified as dominant on those markets has
been considered non-competitive, although active and potential competition in
itself is sufficient to discipline market power. A necessary requirement for future
regulatory reform is the application of a symmetrical regulatory approach, fo-
cussing on network-specific market power based on monopolistic bottlenecks
with no intrinsic bias towards any firm or technology.
It is to be expected that for the near future the period of over-regulation will
continue. Due to the unspecific regulatory obligations of the EU Directives
1 a
large scope of discretionary power of the European Commission in defining the
                                                
1   See in particular: Directive 2002/21/EC of the European Parliament and of the Coun-
cil of 7 March 2002 on a common regulatory framework for electronic communica-
tions networks and services (Framework Directive), OJ L108/33, 24. 4. 2002.
Directive 2002/19/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council on access to,
and interconnection of, electronic communications networks and associated facilities
(Access Directive), OJ L108/7, 24.4. 2002.5
regulatory basis is indicated, including the interaction between the European
Commission and national regulators. This increasing complexity of EU regula-
tion is resulting in a tangle of contradictory decisions and statements, involving
also new markets such as interactive cable television, Internet etc. (Knieps,
2005, pp. 80 f.)
3.2 The phasing-out potentials
3.2.1 Competitive, long-distance networks
Although some markets for long-distance telecommunications services in Ger-
many may be characterized by economies of scale and scope, there is neverthe-
less competition (e.g. Sidak, Engel, Knieps (eds.), 2001). Inefficient suppliers
are replaced by less expensive ones because there is free market entry. Even
when the incumbent's market share is high, inefficient production or services not
geared to market requirements will soon lead to a considerable loss in market
share, as customers are not tied to a specific supplier and can react without delay
to price cuts on the market. There is thus no regulatory need for disciplining the
market power of alternative network providers.
Since overall free entry has become possible, the performance of the German
long-distance telecommunications market has markedly improved. Germany
exhibits a large number of service providers who have increased the scope of
their services, and the country has seen the entry of several network carriers,
which has notably lowered prices for all services.
The market for long-distance transmission capacity is also competitive (Laffont,
Tirole, 2000, p. 98). A larger number of carriers possess their own fibre optic
networks. These competitive long-distance networks are also used as input for
the provision of Internet backbone capacity. Thus, the possibility exists to lease
transmission capacity from several alternative network infrastructure providers.6
3.2.2 Increasing competition within the local loop
Local network competition started with business customers in urban centres
where the preferred access technology was optical fibre. However, after licences
for point-to-multipoint microwave systems were granted by the state, the wire-
less local loop has also been gaining in importance in Germany. Platform com-
petition, where alternative ISPs have complete control of all aspects of their
networks and their corresponding services, has effectively claimed a stake in the
market. Consequently, ever since the comprehensive opening of the telecommu-
nications market, the pressure of innovation has increased in local networks as
well. The competition has led to considerable variety in technological platforms
(e.g. optical fibre, wireless networks, CATV networks and satellite technology),
as well as an increase in product variety.
In addition, because of these rapid developments, the local loop facilities in
larger cities and agglomerations in Germany are increasingly losing their status
as monopolistic bottlenecks. Although it is not possible at this point to predict
exactly how long it will take for network-specific market power in the local loop
to disappear completely, the development of alternative access networks indi-
cates that the potential for phasing out sector-specific regulation in telecommu-
nications should arise in the near future.
4. Mandatory access in the German railroad sector
4.1 The forgotten concept of mandatory access in Prussia
In Germany the perspective of separate network layers in railroad industries has
been a well established concept from the very beginning. The Prussian railway
law of 1838 already provided the legal framework for regulating railways in
such a way that the advantages of competition could have been exploited. The
major argument in favour of a competitive supply of railway services on the
same track has been that it enables the supplier of the best transportation serv-7
ices to use the best route instead of forcing him to build unnecessary tracks with
subsequent inefficient cost duplication.
During the initial phase of railway construction competition among lines, based
on competing alternative routes for railway services, became important. There-
fore, the Prussian railway law prescribing mandatory access was not applied.
But as soon as the competition among lines weakened, it became urgent to in-
troduce efficient regulatory instruments. Due to the increasingly denser network
any further entry would have meant a greater waste of capital. From the per-
spective of the theory of regulation a long-lasting natural monopoly in combina-
tion with irreversible cost occurred.
Around 1870 it was already clear that, if efficient regulation was lacking, this
system would lead to an abuse of market power. It is interesting to note that the
term “natural monopoly” had already been coined at that time. According to Sax
(1879), the monopoly is in the nature of the railway and thus must be regulated.
2
However, since the nationalisation of Prussia’s railways from 1879 onwards –
including tracks and services – was considered a substitute for access regulation,
the disaggregated regulatory framework of the Prussian railway law was never
implemented (Fremdling, Knieps, 1993).
4.2 The period of negotiated third party access
A major goal of the German railroad reform in 1994 has been the entry deregu-
lation of train services in the context of the liberalisation of European transpor-
tation markets. Accounting separation between service level and infrastructure
level was considered a necessary precondition to guarantee non-discriminatory
access to the tracks for all providers of train services. The German railway com-
pany (Deutsche Bahn / DB) is obliged to provide access to the tracks of the
service providers on a non-discriminatory basis. Access charges have to be paid
by all users of the infrastructure.
                                                
2  „Das Monopol liegt in der Natur der Eisenbahn, tritt daher in allen Fällen gleich ein
und muss eben regulirt werden“ (Sax, 1879, p. 148).8
DB issued its first access pricing system on July 1, 1994, consisting of separate
catalogues of prices and conditions for access to its tracks for passenger trans-
port and for freight transport. Its major characteristics were quantity rebates,
based on the total amount of train kilometres undertaken on the track network of
DB. Its successor, the second access pricing system, was issued by DB in June
1998. This revised rail track tariff system featured a two-tier level of charges.
After paying a lump sum fee obtaining an “InfraCard”, the track user was
charged a lower variable price or, on the other hand, without using this card, he
was charged higher rates according to the actual services made use of. Within
each demand group, rail track users were treated on equal terms. The third ac-
cess pricing system, issued by DB in 2001, was characterised by a linear tariff
without volume discounts or optional “InfraCard”. Instead elements of product
differentiation in the form of different categories of track capacities were of-
fered.
The access charges of DB have so far been unregulated. The newly founded
railway-agency only had the task of settling conflicts between DB and third par-
ties which arose in the context of access conditions and access charges. Earlier
critics of DB access charge policy already indicated that the overall level of the
access charges would be too high.
So far the revisions of the access charge system of DB have only taken place in
reaction to public debate. In particular, the accusation that quantity discounts or
non-linear tariffs would be unilaterally in favour of the position of DB as domi-
nant supplier of rail transportation services and that therefore conditions of equal
access to the tracks would be disturbed has led to the introduction of linear ac-
cess charges, which are obviously inadequate to attract more traffic to the rail-
way systems.
Active competition on the German railroad market is focussed on commodity
transportation within Germany as well as local passenger transportation. Entry
into cross-border transportation can rarely be observed; cabotage on foreign
networks within other EU countries does rarely exist. Competitive subscriptions9
for subsidies for local passenger transportation take place only to a limited (al-
though growing) extent.
Since the reform of the railway sector there has been almost no entry of com-
mercial long distance and interregional passenger operators in the German rail
market. More entry can be observed in the German rail freight market. Although
Railion (a DB subsidiary) is still the dominant operator for freight, there are
other private operators emerging in specific freight markets.
4.3 Introduction of mandatory access
Issues of non-discriminatory access to railway infrastructure – including the
question of track-access charges – have increasingly come under consideration
by the German Cartel office. Sector-specific regulation of the German railroad
sector has been introduced only recently. In the meantime a new Rail Infra-
structure Utilisation Regulation has been passed in Germany.
3 Based on the new
EU Rail Directives,
4 a set of detailed requirements has been specified in order to
improve the transparency of the principles and criteria for the allocation of track
capacities as well as the principles of access tariffs. Negotiations concerning the
level of infrastructure charges will in the future only be permitted, if they are
carried out under the supervision of the Federal Network Agency.
                                                
3  Verordnung zum Erlass und zur Änderung eisenbahnrechtlicher Vorschriften vom 3.
Juni 2005, Bundesgesetzblatt Jahrgang 2005, Teil I Nr. 32, ausgegeben zu Bonn am
13. Juni 2005, S. 1566-1577.
4  The Rail Infrastructure Package contains 3 Directives: Directive 2001/12/EC of the
European Parliament and of the Council of 26 February 2001 amending Council
Directive 91/440/EEC on the development of the Community’s railways, OJ L75/1,
15. 3. 2001; Directive 2001/13/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of
26 February 2001 amending Council Directive 95/18/EC on the licensing of railway
undertakings, OJ L 75/26, 15. 3. 2001; Directive 2001/14/EC of the European Par-
liament and of the Council of 26 February 2001 on the allocation of railway infra-
structure capacity and the levying of charges for the use of railway infrastructure and
safety certification, OJ L 75/29, 15. 3. 2001.10
The major goal of theses new railway regulations in Germany is to stimulate ac-
tive competition on the railroad service markets. Competition on the tracks is of
particular importance, because a dense and extensive rail infrastructure network
– owned by DB – already exists and thus competition among tracks – owned by
different companies – is of no practical relevance.
5 Newcomers’ entry onto the
market for rail services broadens the range of services offered extensively as
well as widening consumers’ choices in terms of price and service quality. Op-
portunities for new entrants include the detection and exploitation of new train
service networks, such as the development of a Europe-wide express service for
passengers and goods based on a high-performance, computer-assisted logistics
system. Mandatory access requirements to tracks are based on the intramodal
perspective of train service companies; the decisive factor is the need for com-
plementary service providers to have non-discriminatory access to the monopo-
listic railway infrastructure.
However, the existence of monopolistic bottleneck facilities does not necessarily
guarantee that there will be long-term monopoly profits. Firstly, there is the pos-
sibility of the “necessary case”, where even unregulated providers of railway
infrastructures are unable to meet their costs. Secondly, intermodal competition
by trucks, cars etc. can limit to some extent a track infrastructure provider’s
profit potential.
Ex ante regulation of access charges to railroad tracks should not lead to over-
regulation. The reference point for the regulation of access charges should be the
coverage of the full costs in order to guarantee the viability of the facilities. As a
consequence, it is not anti-competitive for the established firm to not only cover
the incremental costs but also to raise market driven mark ups in order to cover
its total costs (e.g. Baumol, Sidak, 1994, p. 102).
                                                
5  In contrast, in the U.S. rail-to-rail competition among railroad companies owning dif-
ferent tracks as a substitute for rate regulation gained attention since the Coal Rate
Guidelines in 1985 (Coal Rate Guidelines Nationwide, 1 I.C.C.2d 520 (1985),aff’d
sub nom. Consolidated Rail Corp. v. United States, 812 F. 2d 1444 (3d Cir. 1987).
For further details see  Baumol, Sidak (1994, p. 44).11
It is important to differentiate between the price level, where price cap regula-
tion may be justified in order to avoid excessive profits, and the pricing struc-
ture, which must remain unregulated. Regulators should neither be allowed to
prescribe pricing rules that focus on tariff structures within monopolistic bottle-
necks, nor to forbid per se the implementation of non-linear tariffs. Price cap
regulation in the monopolistic bottleneck areas and accounting separation are
sufficient for disciplining the remaining market power and ensuring non-
discriminatory access. Detailed input regulation contradicts the spirit of a price
cap regulation. Not only in the markets for rail services, but also in the monopo-
listic bottleneck areas pricing structures should be flexible und the result of en-
dogenous market processes. The welfare-increasing effects of price differentia-
tion should not be impeded by asymmetrical regulatory intervention.
5. Conclusions
Due to the absence of sunk cost rail services as well as telecommunications
services are competitive. While competition plays an important role for tele-
communications infrastructure, railway infrastructure will continue to be a mo-
nopolistic bottleneck in the foreseeable future. As a consequence, forward-
looking perspectives regarding the potential for the phasing out of sector-
specific regulation remain quite different for telecommunications as compared
to the railroad sector.
Network services can be provided efficiently in competitive markets, if non-
discriminatory access to the complementary infrastructure capacities is guaran-
teed. The sector-symmetric application of the disaggregated regulatory approach
to railways and telecommunications, respectively, reveals the different role of
mandatory access. Whereas in telecommunications only the local loop may cre-
ate a remaining regulatory problem, mandatory access has to be guaranteed with
respect to the railway infrastructure as a whole. In spite of the large phasing-out
potentials of sector-specific regulation in telecommunications, this sector is still
under the burden of overregulation. In contrast, in the railway sector mandatory
access has been introduced only recently. The really challenging task for the12
newly founded German Federal Network Agency is to exploit the potentials of
negotiated network access, to apply mandatory access only to those parts of the
networks where network-specific market power still exists, and to resist the
temptations of overregulation by heavy-handed supervision of firms.
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